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The Japanese Self-Defense Force

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THE JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE FORCE

While the post-World War II world has witnessed a resurgence of Japanese economic and political power, her military strength has remained relatively insignificant. However, the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine has forced Japan into a position of seriously considering the necessity of rearmament. The extent and direction of this defense–oriented rearmament remains to be seen, but the nuclear potential of Japan removes the issue from the realm of domestic politics and places it squarely in the midstream of international concern.

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by
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Over 25 years have passed since the defeat and unconditional surrender of Imperial Japan in August 1945. During the intervening years she has been rebuilt into an economic superpower, but, unlike other superpowers, one rejecting military force as a means of foreign policy. Much of this reluctance to rearm has been based on the ability of Japan to rely on the United States-Japan Security Treaty to deter direct external aggression. The 1960 treaty continues to provide for the maintenance of U.S. bases in Japan, and both parties agree that an "armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous" to both and that each "would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes." So long as Japan has had confidence in its dependent relationship with the United States, there has been no motive to increase defense expenditures. In fact, many Japanese attribute much of their current economic prosperity to the relatively low level of defense expenditure.

The guidelines which have both directed and, at times, restricted the development of the Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF) were set forth formally in the 1957 statement of "Basic National Defense Policy" quoted here in its entirety:

> The purpose of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression, and, once invaded, to repel it in order to preserve the independence and peace of Japan which takes democracy for its basis.
>
> To achieve this purpose, the Government of Japan adopts the following principles:
>
> • To support the activities of the United Nations and its promotion of international cooperation, thereby contributing to the cause of world peace.

- To promote the national welfare and enhance the spirit of patriotism, thereby laying a sound basis for national security.
- To develop gradually an effective defensive power within the bounds of national capabilities to the extent necessary for self-defense.
- To cope with aggression by recourse to the joint security system with the United States of America, pending effective functioning of the United Nations in preventing and removing aggression.[1]

In pursuit of this basic policy, Japan has now completed three 5-year plans. The expenditures for these plans are shown in table I in terms of absolute yen expenditures, in terms of defense expenditures as a percentage of gross national product, (GNP) and as a percentage of the national budget. (Earlier expenditures were proportionally higher, peaking in FY 1952 at nearly 20 percent of the national budget and 3 percent of the GNP.)

This data may be interpreted to illustrate that defense funds allocated to the 5-year plans, when considered as a percentage of the GNP or a percentage of the national budget, have tended to decrease. Far more significant, however, is the fact that absolute yen expenditures for defense have nearly doubled with each succeeding plan. It is estimated that during the fourth 5-year plan (1972-76), if increases are spread evenly over the years, the annual increase in defense appropriations will approach 18 percent compounded annually, a percentage slightly in excess of the 15.7 percent annual rate of increase in Japan's GNP recorded for the years 1961-1970 inclusive.

Funds have not been used to increase manpower; indeed, as the figures indicate, the total numbers of armed personnel have increased by only 10,000 since 1957. Emphasis has instead been placed on improved equipment for the respective self-defense forces. Authorized active duty personnel strengths for the first and fourth 5-year plans are shown in table 2.[2]

The entire evolution of Japan's defense power under the various 5-year plans has been gradual, hardly commensurate with her economic growth, limited in comparison to Japan's Asian neighbors,[3] almost entirely defensive in nature, and strictly conventional.

The fourth 5-year defense plan (1972-76) is essentially a continuation of previous plans in its emphasis on the improvement of the overall triservice defense capability. This plan does put

TABLE I—JAPAN'S DEFENSE EXPENDITURES (IN BILLION YEN)

5-Year Plans	Defense Expenditures	Def. Exp. as % of GNP	Def. Exp. as % of National Budget
*1st (1957-61)	791.2	1.12%	10.1%
2d (1962-66)	1384.2	0.95%	8.1%
3d (1967-71)	2527.2 (est.)	0.80%	7.2%
4th (1972-76)	4630.0 (est.)	0.88% (est.)	7.0% (est.)

*The "so-called" first 5-year plan was decided in June 1957 and actually applied to FY's 1958-1960, but figures for a full 5-year period are included for ease of comparison.

Figures are for fiscal years which begin on 1 April of the year indicated. Dollar figure conversions for the 5-year plan at ¥360 = $1 are: first plan—$2.197 billion; second plan—$3.845 billion; third plan—$7.020 billion; fourth plan—$12.777 billion. With the rate of ¥270 = $1, the current fourth 5-year plan total is $17.037 billion. The second plan was 175 percent of the first; the third plan was 183 percent of the second; the fourth plan will be about 182 percent of the third, or 243 percent at the current dollar/yen exchange rate.

TABLE II

	GSDF	MSDF	ASDF	Total
1st "Five Year Plan" (1957-61)	180,000	34,000	41,586	255,586
4th "Five Year Plan" (1972-76)	180,000	37,000	48,000	265,000

added emphasis on making this capability "autonomous" and shifting as much as possible to domestic production of the advanced equipment and weapons systems needed. The GSDF, for instance, will increase its tank strength from 660 to 880, including 120 new-model, domestically built tanks. The armored vehicle inventory will remain at 650, but 136 new-model vehicles will be procured. The number of self-propelled artillery pieces will be more than doubled from 60 to 140 and will include pieces of 107mm., 105mm., and 155mm. Total helicopter strength will increase only from 280 to 320 aircraft, but 154 will be new. Three Hawk units (ground-to-air, short-range missile units) will be added and located in Okinawa, West Kyushu, and the Osaka-Kobe area. The general goal is more firepower and more mobility. The MSDF will decrease the number of vessels from 210 to 170 but increase tonnage from 170,000 tons to 214,000 tons. The naval forces seek new construction (96,000 tons) not only to enhance the defense capacity in Japan's coastal waters but for the security of sea transport as well. Two helicopter carrying escort ships and one surface-to-surface missile carrying ship are planned. Tactical naval combat aircraft and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft inventories will be increased slightly to 200 and 190 aircraft, respectively, but about half of these totals will be new aircraft. For the ASDF, aircraft strength will be reduced more than 10 percent, from 880 to 770, but new types of aircraft will be added. Most important was the much disputed decision to produce domestically the FST2, a ground support fighter aircraft, rather than to import similar aircraft from the United States. The air reconnaissance capability will be improved by acquiring the RF4E, also new to the ASDF. The inventory of the all-weather interceptor F4EJ's will be increased from 80 to 120. Significant increases will be made in the acquisition of the jet trainer aircraft T2 (from four to 60) and of transport aircraft C1 (from four to 30). ASDF Nike units (medium-range, surface-to-surface missiles) will be increased from four to six, with new sites to be established on Okinawa and in the Aomori-Hakodate area. Other objectives of the fourth plan are: (1) the development of research on electronics to increase the capabilities for early warning and ASW patrolling along with various types of guided missiles, including air-to-surface antiship missiles, (2) the establishment of an even wider base of support for defense power among the people by even more positive civil works and disaster relief operations, and (3) improvement in the treatment of SDF personnel and better preparation for their return to civilian society when the term of service is completed.[4] Thus, while some change is evident in this fourth plan, it represents no real expansion on the part of the JSDF.

The reasons for this "go slow" approach fall into two basic categories, the constitutional prohibition (article 9) on armed forces, which inhibits even those members of the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) who would prefer more rapid and extensive rearmament, and domestic political opposition to rearmament. Although the LDP has controlled the Government of

Japan since the party was formed in 1955, it must constantly face opposition not only to increased defense budgets but even to the maintenance of armed forces of any type.

Opposition notwithstanding, the dominance of the LDP seems likely to endure without a serious challenge for at least the next few years. The conservative coalition of factions which comprises the LDP has had a rather successful stewardship of Japan's interests. Their basic policies have provided resources for enviable economic development and unprecedented individual prosperity. Japan's image in Asia may not be highly regarded everywhere, but at least the "threat from Japan" is now economic and not military. The long-hoped-for normalization of relations with China was accomplished with ease, and perhaps Soviet-Japanese relations will progress to mutually acceptable goals. The United States-Japan relationship, however, remains a problem, and its adjustment will have important consequences for both.

Some External Considerations. The U.S. foreign policy initiatives signaled by the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine at Guam in July 1969 have accompanied wide-ranging changes in interstate relationships and have perhaps provided the impetus to those parties in Japan seeking a more "autonomous" Japanese defense policy. It also seemed to President Nixon that the U.S. role was "too dominant, our presence too pervasive" in the changing circumstances of the times. The high cost of war in Vietnam with concomitant internal strains, worsening deficits in balance of payments and the willingness of adversaries to compromise led to the adoption of principles designed to strike a balance between "overextension and withdrawal." The Nixon Doctrine is stated as follows:

> First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.
>
> Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.
>
> Third, in cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility for providing the manpower for its defense.[5]

This set of ideas has provided a rationale for the withdrawal of 550,000 U.S. troops from Southeast Asia and more than 100,000 troops and dependents from other parts of Asia. Reduction of the U.S. participation in the war in Vietnam removed a major military justification for continuing U.S. control of the Ryukyu Islands. As such, they reverted to Japanese control in May 1972. In the view of the Nixon Doctrine, the return for these long-held islands may be seen as a means to encourage, if not force, Japan to accept widened area responsibility for self-defense. The JSDF now has forces in the Ryukyus in addition to the U.S. bases continued there. Also as a direct result of the return to Japanese control, the U.S. bases must be without chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and are subject to the same restrictions which apply to other U.S. bases in the four main islands of Japan. These bases and facilities have been steadily reduced over the years (from 2,284 at the time of the 1952 peace treaty to about 90) but still occupy about 850 square kilometers of area and several million square meters of building space. Japan expects further reduction of U.S. bases area "in the light of the Nixon Doctrine."[6] The

total strength of combined U.S. and SDF forces in Japan has decreased from 362,000 in 1954 to less than 300,000 today.

In its apparent application to Japanese-United States relations, the Nixon Doctrine represents little change. It reaffirms that the United States intends to continue its security treaty with Japan (now susceptible to cancellation by either party with 1 year's notice), that the United States still provides the "nuclear shield" (from outside Japan), and that Japan has the main responsibility to provide manpower for its own defense. Commenting on the "doctrine," the Japanese Ambassador to the United States stated that Japan understands the Nixon Doctrine, is prepared to assume responsibility for its own security, and the most appropriate role for Japan is to be a strong partner in U.S. efforts to promote stability.[7]

Tradition breaking reorientations of U.S. policy toward the major military powers in East Asia—China and the U.S.S.R.—are of far more import to Japan than the specific content of the Nixon Doctrine. The Nixon "shocks" of the summer of 1971 may have been useful in the long run, perhaps necessary, for the eventual achievement of an "equal partner" relationship between Japan and the United States. However, the suddenness and secrecy of the policy shift was a serious, perhaps unnecessary, embarrassment to the LDP and the Government of Japan. The United States made new departures without consulting the nation the President has called "our major ally in Asia." No doubt the Japanese have once more learned the lesson that a country must, on occasion, pursue policies independent of its allies. Japan reacted by extending diplomatic recognition to Outer Mongolia and Bangladesh.

The gradual accommodation between China and the United States, the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, the initial successes of SALT I, Soviet approaches to Japan, the apparently stabilizing influence of Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik, and the possibility of pursuing the Soviet-United States détente through SALT II negotiations and mutual balanced force reduction, and Japan's continuing economic gains and growing self-confidence make it difficult, but no less inviting, to coin terms to describe what is emerging. President Nixon has spoken of "five superpowers"—the United States, the U.S.S.R., Western Europe, China, and Japan—"each balancing the other, not playing one against the other, an even balance." Commentators have described the regional triangle in East Asia as consisting of the U.S.S.R., China, and the United States,[8] or the United States, China, and Japan,[9] but it would probably be accurate in any case to say that the world of the 1970's will be characterized by a continuing nuclear bipolarity and political and economic multipolarity.

Japan's proper place in this "new order" has been the subject of much debate and hard thought in Japan.

The first major public exposition of Japan's reoriented defense policy was the *Defense White Paper* of 1970. It reaffirmed Japan's subscription to the ideals of the United Nations but recognized "the rule of force in international society" and the limited nature of the U.N.'s peacekeeping functions.[10] Concerned with "military bi-polarization centering on the US and the USSR, and political multipolarization based on the keynote of independence," especially in the fluid and increasingly complicated politics of East Asia, Japan's inherent right of self-defense and the maintenance of defense power was reiterated[11] and in some respects amplified. For instance, national defense was spoken of primarily as a question of "the people's mental attitude," the very basis of defense being a "national consensus" to "defend the peace and independence of the country to the last."

The nation was warned not to fall into dependence on another, for this might bring a sense of irresponsibility toward national defense and degenerate the national spirit. Patriotism and "autonomous defense" were the key words to a policy of "defense of the nation . . . primarily by the people."[12] Defense remained the overriding consideration, and the Government again denied itself the right to possess weapons which pose a threat of aggression against other nations, including bombers like the B-52, attack carriers, and ICBM's. The "three-no" nuclear policy was restated: no manufacture, no possession, and no placing of nuclear weapons on Japanese soil, but this denial was qualified by the statement that it would be permissible for Japan to have nuclear weapons "falling within the minimum requirement for the capacity necessary for self-defense and not posing a threat of aggression to other countries."[13]

While striving for an "autonomous defense" capability, Japan continues to rely on the security treaty with the United States for the deterrence of nuclear war and the large-scale armed conflicts which might destroy Japan, apparently gaining assurance from statements such as that of Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to JDA Director General Nakasone in 1970. The Director General was informed that the United States will abide by its commitments under the treaty and "will use all types of weapons for the defense of Japan." Nevertheless, Japan is aware of the asymmetry of the treaty provisions by which the United States is obligated to come to the defense of Japan although Japan is not required to come to the defense of the United States in any case where U.S. forces are attacked outside of areas not administered by Japan.[14]

The *Defense White Paper* confirmed that "the nation of Japan will become a great power in an economic sense but never in a military sense."[15] In economic terms Japan has achieved great power status and will become even more powerful, both absolutely and relatively. Compared with 1971, Japan's foreign trade for 1972 was up 19 percent to more than $52 billion, and the international balance of payments reserves held by Japan approached $17 billion in April 1973.

The Nomura Research Institute of Technology and Economics recently estimated that Japan's GNP will reach $846.7 billion in 1977, about half the GNP predicted for the United States in the same year. According to Nomura's predictions, the *real* GNP annual rate of increase will be about 10.4 percent, substantially the same as experienced in the past 5 years. The report also predicted that Japan's per capita income in 1977 will rank third ($6,287), behind Sweden ($7,200) and the United States ($6,500).[16]

Japanese are quick to point out that Japan's enormous economic power will not necessarily be used for stronger military forces. It is, nevertheless, a historical commonplace that nations with great economic strength are also nations with great military power. In Japan's particular case the pre-World War II pattern of economic development and the course of Japanese imperialism were not "inevitably related," according to Professor Hall, although Japanese scholars have insisted imperialist expansion was so related to the particular form of capitalism developed in Japan. Hall believes that much of the Japanese drive for military expansion "came as result of the competitive international environment into which the new state was plunged."[17]

Probably the most ready believers in the inevitable remilitarization of Japan were the Chinese. A campaign against United States-Japanese defense relations was mounted in great earnest immediately following the Sato-Nixon agreements in late 1969 which provided for reversion of the Ryukyus to Japanese control. The *Renmin Ribao* charged the

United States with using Japanese reactionaries as a "gendarme in Asia" in their joint "vicious conspiracy" and "criminal schemes to engineer a new war of aggression." Japan was said to be scheming to annex Taiwan and pay off Chiang's "bandit gang" by helping them against the mainland. In short, the monopoly capitalist groups in Japan intended to accelerate the revival of militarism, engage in aggression in a "big way," and to "realize | their | old dream of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."[18] But Sato is no longer Premier of Japan, the United States and China have exchanged "ambassadors," and China and Japan have "normalized" relations. Today the Peking press has a different line.[19] Whether Chinese leaders believed what they had published about the intent of a United States-Japanese "military-industrial complex" to wage aggressive war in Asia is open to question. Nevertheless, Japan's economic power and military potential are beyond doubt and the source of genuine concern both to Japan's neighbors and a significant segment of the Japanese public. One observer has written that Japan in the 1970's is "neither left nor liberal but archconservative." He further attempts to show, among other things, that there is a definite resurgence of military strength in Japan and that the "ruling elite" believes military power is necessary to maintain long-term economic power.[20]

On the other hand, equally sound reasons are advanced against Japanese rearmament, even if undertaken only for the purposes of protecting the rapidly expanding overseas investment and general foreign economic influence. Saburo Okita sees Japanese public opinion as decidedly antimilitaristic, simply because in the world today military strength cannot protect private assets overseas. A military buildup to protect such assets is judged "absurd" in terms of a cost-benefit calculation, suggesting that the best course in case of nationalization or seizure of Japanese assets overseas would be compensation paid by the Japanese Government. Many Japanese believe that Japan has a unique opportunity to demonstrate the possibilities of economic power without military strength. Such a goal is justifiable and perhaps more likely of realization in the "changed circumstance of security and defense strategy produced by nuclear weapons."[21]

These arguments about Japan's future use of economic resources vis-a-vis military power can be reduced to a perception of determinism at work. Certainly Japan's past experience, the knowledge of how other states have behaved, and even her conception of man's potential for change are involved in judging whether Japan is likely to succeed in what former Premier Sato called an "unprecedented era in foreign affairs." Simply stated, the goal is to "break all precedents in history and to give history an unheard of challenge by aiming at a new utopia where top priority shall be given to social welfare and world peace."[22] Attachment of high priority to the pursuit of economic values is a characteristic of modern industrial states and may be an appropriate goal to satisfy Japanese ambitions for international recognition and respect.

Without significantly increased military power, however, Japan cannot compete in all aspects of the five-sided multipolarity mentioned by Nixon. Japan tends to place less credibility in the American security guarantee and does not desire American military intervention even in the unlikely circumstance that Japan were to be invaded.[23] It is probably true that most Americans are equally unwilling to see more intervention and that most question the worth of the various security guarantees, Japan's included. Japan is certain to strive for greater independence and freedom of action, especially from the

United States, in broad-ranging efforts to enhance its own self-image as a "success" and as a nation with values to offer the rest of the world, not the least of which is that of a "nation of peace."

Whether Japan will "rearm" is no longer an issue. Rearmament is a fact. The important question is, What are the probable limits, qualitatively and quantitatively, on Japan's Self-Defense Forces?

The limits to Japanese defense power stated in the *Defense White Paper* are general of terms regarding conventional rearmament. Japan's defense power is for self-defense only, and its scale "must be what is proper and necessary." Defense power may not be used for any purpose which exceeds "the scope of self-defense," and overseas dispatch of troops will not be permitted. A proper balance must control the allocation of scarce resources for social security, education, and other high priority items. Furthermore, the simple determination of defense allocations on the basis of a percentage of the GNP is not "necessarily appropriate" to a "proper balance."[24]

An assessment of the proper balance is essayed by former Kyoto University Professor Inoki, now Superintendent of the Japan Defense Academy, in his recent book *Kuni wo Mamoru.*[25] Inoki is acutely conscious that it has been but a few years since the Japanese Empire raised such slogans as "High Degree Defense State" (*Koodo Kokuboo Kokka*), engaged in war, and "collapsed like a balloon," but he also rejects the argument current today that the only solution to Japan's security problem lies in having no military power so that Japan will threaten no nation. Inoki suggests that a state with "excessive" armaments certainly courts self-destruction, but a country with no armaments will likewise perish. He is also concerned that many Japanese fear too much the nuclear power of neighboring giants and "would like to make Japan one of their satellites."

Another piece of conventional wisdom Inoki treats is the assertion that it is impossible for civilized countries to commit aggression against civilized countries. Contemporary aggression, he argues, is not limited to the entry of tanks into a nation's capital. The forte of the great powers today is the skillful use of force short of war, thereby forcing weak and small countries to submit to their will. Given this situation the threatened side must "prepare its defense power appropriate to its national power," and, in the worst case, be determined to inflict some damage on the other partner. Only then will the great power honor the sovereignty and independence of the threatened party. This argument leads to the definition of the proper balance defense power is the "necessary condition" adequate to "protect the nation's independence and to prevent disdain from outside."

Whether Japan has "excessive" defense power can be decided only in terms of concrete circumstances. Comparing Japan's GNP, size of defense forces, characteristics of equipment and similar items, Inoki is certain that Japan's defense power is not "excessive," for it poses no threat to its neighbors. On the other hand, the simple possession of defense power is no guarantee of a nation's security. Any country which, like Japan in the 1930's and 1940's, treats its neighbors like enemies and errs in its foreign policies will end in defeat; it matters not how much power a nation has. Defense power remains a prerequisite for national security, but it never is the sole sufficient criterion.

Applying this theory to modern Japan, Professor Inoki recommends a "six-area" program of foreign policy objectives subsumed under the general theory that the dominant objective for Japan must be to minimize the number of nations hostile to Japan and to be

friendly with the maximum number. Top priority is given to relations with the United States, but reciprocity and equality between Japan and China are counted "the indispensable foundation of peace in East Asia." Japan's policy toward China must be based on the realization that it is clearly beneficial for China to be friendly to Japan. She must, thirdly, strive for better relations with the U.S.S.R., particularly in mutually beneficial projects such as the development of the Tyumen oilfields. Although there is some opinion that Japan cannot be friendly with both China and the U.S.S.R. at a time when the two are competing so intensely, this view ignores the fact of Japan's independence which must be the basis for relations with both. The fourth set of policies concerns North Korean-Republic of Korea (ROK) relations, events which Japan must follow with patience. Indeed, the best way to improve relations with the various countries of Southeast Asia is for Japan to strive "with humility and modesty to promote the image of Japan as a country of peace." In the fifth place, good relations are desirable with the former self-governing dominions of England—New Zealand, Australia, and Canada. The common thread running through these nations and Japan is the "invisible and powerful feeling of solidarity" among nations sharing democratic traditions. The last set of relations for Japan to cultivate are those with West European countries, mostly because they share the problems common to advanced industrial states with the possibility of increasingly comprehensive areas of cooperation. The same feeling of democratic solidarity also binds Japan to these countries, but Inoki emphasizes the similar postwar experience. Both West Europe and Japan have been "defended by the gigantic military power of the United States"; both have become very strong economically, but weak militarily; American military power is gradually being withdrawn from both areas; "Japan and the European Community have a common destiny in military matters." In summary, Inoki states the "one road to guarantee the security of Japan is to continue to develop a peace diplomacy in six directions" while simultaneously building "strong defense power" appropriate in scale.

The approach to Japan's security outlined here does not, and could not, deal in concrete terms with the specific programs which implement—or define—defense policy. The size and type of SDF which Japan will have by 1976 seems fairly clear. Decisions concerned with the program to follow the current fourth 5-year plan must, however, be made in the next couple of years. These decisions will be made in a complex matrix of Japan's perceptions of the programs, intent, policy, and goals of the U.S.S.R., the United States, and China and the interplay of the increasingly active contacts of all types among the four major states interested in East Asia. Decisions must also consider events in the Korean peninsula, Taiwan, and the postwar interplay between states in Southeast Asia and external powers. On another level, intangible but very real, factors will be brought to bear in terms of Japan's willed role in world affairs, feelings of patriotism or nationalism, however defined, and the desire of Japan to be treated as an independent nation controlling its own destiny so far as possible. The competitive nature of interstate relations in the Western Pacific is likely to become more intense, perhaps taking forms as yet unforeseen. In this situation it seems likely that the sense of security—the absence of external threat—which Japan has enjoyed for so many years may be diminished, if solely from the uncertainty attendant on these new relationships.

Nuclear Weapons Policy. The funda-

mental decision in Japan's postwar defense policy has been to rely on the Japan–United States Security Treaty for defense against external aggression, but another equally important decision lies in the future with respect to nuclear weapons. The initial "nuclear" decision has been articulated in a definite and frequently repeated manner: "no manufacture, no possession, and no introduction of nuclear weapons into the territory of Japan." However, this definitive assertion is not entirely believed, either in Japan or elsewhere.

Although one survey showed that only about 30 percent believed Japan would have nuclear weapons in the next decade, Hermann Kahn has pointed out that the "nuclear allergy" in Japan does not "represent a firm commitment to nuclear pacificism by a majority of the Japanese people." He believes that, given the economic and technological stature Japan will probably achieve, most Japanese will inevitably feel that Japan has the "right and duty" to secure for itself superpower status–and this means having a "substantial nuclear establishment."[26] Four years ago Professor Kei Wakaizumi suggested the probability "is not a small one" that in the time frame of 1975-1980, after carefully weighing all other alternatives, "Japan will choose the road to nuclear armament." He does qualify this statement by saying that, on balance, such a decision seems unlikely to be a "deliberate choice of the government of Japan."[27] A more recent prediction attributes a high degree of probability to the assertion that Japan will acquire nuclear weapons and should emerge in the 1980's as the "fourth nuclear superpower."[28]

The three fundamental statements of current Japanese policy on nuclear weapons deserve closer examination. "No possession" means that Japan will not accept nuclear weapons provided to Japan on any basis by another state. "No introduction" means Japan will not permit any other state to deploy nuclear weapons on Japanese territory. It would, indeed, require an imaginative scenarist to develop hypothetical situations in which either course of action would provide any clear benefit to Japan in terms of probable costs. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) prohibits signatories from supplying nuclear weapons to other states, and the common interest in nonproliferation would seem adequate to prevent it. Neither China nor France adhere to the NPT, but it is impossible to conjecture that providing nuclear weapons to Japan would enhance their own security or contribute to other national goals, even in the remote circumstance that Japan would seek nuclear armaments from either of them. The introduction of nuclear weapons into Japanese territory by another power could only infringe on Japanese sovereignty, limit Japan's independence, and make Japan hostage to another country's interests.

The question remains, however, as to whether Japan will decide to manufacture nuclear weapons. Many of those who answer affirmatively are not Japanese, and their arguments are rooted essentially in historical precedent, not military rationale. The major assumption underlying the *pro* argument is that never before has a nation with great economic strength and technological and managerial development foregone "commensurate" military power. The development of great military power is somehow seen as predetermined and inevitable.

This line of reasoning suggests that Japan's acknowledged "success" in economic and political matters entitles Japan to a larger voice in determining the shape of the world–by other means than example. A burgeoning nationalism and self-confidence will demand that Japan acquire more power in diplomatic circles, both regional and worldwide. A permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council may be an attainable objective

without great military power, but no Japanese who ponders the matter is unaware that the current five incumbents are, in fact, the five nuclear powers.

In its bilateral relations with the United States, "equality" may not be attainable under any circumstances, but in the terms of "mutual" security, "equality" is manifestly impossible if Japan does not have an independent nuclear capability. The apparent détente between the United States and the U.S.S.R., begun with SALT I and being sought in SALT II, may limit armament competition between the two superpowers, but China remains outside these agreements and is a factor to be dealt with by Japan.

Like Japan, the Chinese constantly deny any aspirations to "great power status," but Japanese officials remark that "China is surely a superpower in Asia."[29] Nor are Chinese denials of a desire for regional hegemony necessarily taken at face value in Japan. China's nuclear capability, although dwarfed by that of the United States and the U.S.S.R., does pose a threat to Japan. General opinion is that the probability of its active use against Japan is miniscule, yet the Japanese also know the potential of China which could make her a major nuclear power in 15-20 years.

The credibility of American commitments to various Asian countries, decreased by reduction of the American troop presence and constantly opposed by important segments of the congressional and intellectual communities, provides the possibility for a "vacuum" in regional power. Some believe it is the intent of the United States to create such a vacuum to be filled by a Japan that would consequently play the role of "balancer" in East Asia, if not that of "nuclear guarantor" played heretofore by the United States. But for Japan the "military rationale" for nuclear weapons seems to rest on the simple need to protect the lengthy sea routes for the $50 billion annual foreign trade and to protect the oil lifeline to the Middle East by which Japan receives 90 percent of its oil imports. Such a task is impossible with conventional armaments, one argues, and can be accomplished solely through the maintenance of a nuclear deterrent force, respect for which inhibits conventional interference with sea lines of communications.

It is argued that Japan's signature of the NPT in 1970 (2 years after the major signatories) has not been followed by ratification; therefore, Japan intends at some time to produce nuclear weapons. This argument is not totally convincing since it is more likely that Japan is simply keeping its options open. Statements of Japan's leaders a few years ago were indeed categorical on the subject of nuclear weapons; recently they have become highly contingent. For instance, Premier Tanaka's recent Diet policy speech repeated the "three principles" but included a statement that Japan does require a minimum defense capability—the "duty and responsibility of an independent nation"[30]—and that nuclear weapons are permissible if defensive in nature. If Japan does reject or fails to ratify the NPT, the production of nuclear weapons is still not certain. However, there are two nuclear weapons systems which could qualify as strictly "defensive," antiballistic missile (ABM) systems and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) systems. In neither case would nuclear warheads be directly targeted on any foreign land target. They would be usable only against enemy offensive nuclear weapons or to defend against enemy submarines.[31] If ratification of the NPT is frustrated, "pro-bomb tendencies will have been accelerated."[32]

Another view links the possibility of Japan's acquisition of nuclear weapons with actions by the United States. Professor Brzezinski states that the appearance of deep divisions about defense

policy in the United States cannot but impel Japan to develop a major military establishment of its own, eventually including a nuclear capability. He believes "it is almost axiomatic that an isolationist United States will definitely create a nationalist and militarist Japan."[33] Former Ambassador Ball has written that pressure for Japan to "go nuclear" is most likely to come from a desire for political status rather than from concern over national security or from "any informed calculation of economic interest." Japan, he feels, is likely to go nuclear only if it feels alienated from the West and strongly nationalistic—"the very conditions which might render Japan's nuclear power disruptive and dangerous."[34]

A major assumption underlying arguments that Japan will not manufacture nuclear weapons is that to do so would be more dangerous than not doing so; thus, security will be increased by self-denial. This is particularly true in cases where no significant external threat exists, and Japan simply does not perceive any serious threat from other nuclear powers. Whatever threat may have been perceived is likely to diminish with improving relations among Japan, China, and the U.S.S.R. Changing U.S. attitudes toward China and the U.S.S.R. have had complimentary demarches by Japan. America's major competitors in both Asia and Europe are moving from the "hostile" toward the "nonhostile" category. How much less reason is there for Japan openly to antagonize and challenge China and the U.S.S.R. by producing nuclear weapons. With her apparent progress in improving relations among major competitors, it is unlikely that the United States would appreciate Japan going nuclear.

Domestic attitudes on nuclear policy matters are of vital importance in Japan. Rather much has been made of the "shallow" character of the "nuclear allergy," but it is probably stronger and more persistent than some have thought.[35] Closely linked to general public disapproval of nuclear weapons is the possibility that their manufacture would require changes in the Constitution, a move opposed both domestically and internationally.

Long, narrow, and small in size, Japan is uniquely vulnerable to nuclear attack, and Japanese are acutely sensitive to this geographical fact. According to most nuclear scenarios, the assured destruction requirements are estimated to be 30 percent of the target country population. Japan would probably suffer this amount of damage from four nuclear weapons on Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, and Kita Kyushu, all vital centers for Government and military functions. If Japan desired an offsetting deterrent, it would necessitate an overwhelming nuclear superiority. It is patently impossible for Japan to deter the United States and the U.S.S.R. and only a little less difficult to deter China. Even the construction of a "purely defensive" ABM system would have serious drawbacks because of the extremely short warning time (2 minutes?) which could be provided against Chinese weapons. Aside from the costs of producing nuclear weapons and the lack of any test sites, the almost certain absence of any benefit which would accrue to Japan from attempting to develop a second strike capability—and this is what deterrence is all about—seems to prohibit nuclear weapons development by Japan.

The Future. Japan's defense policy cannot be considered as an entity unto itself; rather, it will be molded by broad political and economic considerations within the totality of Japanese domestic and foreign policy. Foreign policy will assuredly stress independence of action in a spirit illustrated by the recent editorial which cautioned, "The world is not something which follows the specifications established by one country—the US."[36] Of course, Japan has had several options opened to her by the current

restructuring of power relationships in East Asia. In gross terms, some of these are: (1) renunciation of the Japan-United States treaty and the acquisition of nuclear weapons, (2) continuation of the security relationship with the United States on a much narrower base, (3) continuation of the current relationship with the United States with close cooperation in security matters and even closer relationships on economic and political matters,[37] (4) alliance with the U.S.S.R. or China, (5) a withdrawal from the political conflict through regional neutralization and assumed reliance on such international organizations as the U.N., and (6) a "go-it-alone" policy under the concept of "fortress Japan."[38] These courses of action are not mutually exclusive and individually are susceptible to several variations in detail. What is certain is that Japan must in some manner accommodate itself to these changing relationships and probably will do so in ways least disruptive domestically and internationally.

Japan has for 25 years renounced any role as a world power in the historical sense of having military forces commensurate with economic power. But Japan cannot afford to be irresponsible about this economic strength. She must find ways to channel these tremendous resources into politically productive projects, both at home and abroad. Hopefully, these projects will preclude large Japanese investments in military technology markedly different from the past.

What one may expect of Japan's defense power throughout the fourth 5-year defense plan (1972-1976) is clear. Japan will continue a limited, defensive, and conventional (non-nuclear) defense program accenting qualitative improvement in materiel, making no significant increase in authorized personnel strengths, and devoting less than 1 percent of the GNP to defense but at a rate nearly doubling its absolute defense expenditures.

The central Japanese consideration for the post-1976 development of the SDF is once again the Japan-United States Security Treaty. Both sides agree that it should be based on equality and reciprocity, terms which probably are not agreed to in detail and which are necessarily viewed from different perspectives. The treaty is now susceptible to yearly revision (or abrogation), and changes are probably desirable to both sides toward lessening of U.S. responsibility and an increasing of Japan's. Special consideration should be given to the continued withdrawal of U.S. units and return of bases to Japanese control. These actions would certainly relieve some of Japan's domestic social and political problems which have arisen from treaty arrangements. Withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Japan with rights to use Japanese bases and facilities for training or in emergencies is a possibility.

The key element in continuation of the security relationship will be the Japanese decision as to whether she wants to depend, decisively and ulti-

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

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mately, on the United States for her security. If, temporarily at least, Japan must depend on one state, that state will undoubtedly be the United States. In the long run, however, Japan may turn away from excessive dependence on one state and seek security through multilateral means. It is possible that Japan may seek to achieve security solely through her own efforts, but the attempt would be severely circumscribed by strong domestic opposition, opposed by powers with interests in Asia, damaging the carefully cultivated postwar image of a peaceful Japan, uncertain in its consequences, and likely to decrease, rather than increase, Japan's sense of security.

NOTES

1. *Boei Nenkan 1972* (Tokyo: Defense Yearbook Publishing Co., 1972), p. 212.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 210-211.
3. The personnel strengths of the armed forces of nations with major interests in northeast Asia are: (world ranking in parentheses):

Nation		Armed Forces (1,000 men)
U.S.S.R.	(1)	3,535
China	(2)	3,100
United States	(3)	3,066
Republic of Korea	(6)	645
Taiwan	(7)	522
North Korea	(12)	438
Japan	(21)	252

Figures are for 1970, extracted from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures 1971* (Washington, D.C.), p. 50.

4. *Asagumo*, 12 October 1972.
5. U.S. Presidents, 1969-(Nixon) *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Shaping a Durable Peace*, A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, 3 May 1973 (Washington, D.C., 1973), pp. 109-110.
6. Japan Defense Agency, *The Defense of Japan* (Tokyo: October 1970), pp. 62-63. Figures as of 1970. (Hereafter cited as *Defense White Paper*.)
7. Nobuhiko Ushiba, "Japan-Her Role in World Affairs," *Naval War College Review*, April 1971, p. 18.
8. Hedley Bull, "The New Balance of Power in Asia and the Pacific," *Foreign Affairs*, June 1971, p. 669.
9. Pyong-choon Hahm, "Korea and the Emerging Asia Power Balance," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1972, p. 343.
10. One Director General of the JDA lost his job for stating the "UN was like a rural credit association" where even a small country had one vote. Naomi Nishimura was removed by Premier Sato on 3 December 1971. *Japan Times Weekly*, 11 December 1971.
11. *Defense White Paper*, p. 28, quotes the Sunakawa Judgment of the Supreme Court (16 December 1959), which states the Constitution

> does not in any way deny the inherent right of self-defense which our country possesses as a sovereign state; the pacificism of Japan's Constitution by no means implies no defense and no resistance . . .. That our country can take measures for self-defense necessary to maintain its peace and security and to insure its survival must be said to be a matter of course, as the exercise of the functions inherent to a state.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 29-33.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 41-44.
15. *Defense White Paper*, introductory statement by Yashuhiro Nakasone, Director General, JDA, p. ii.
16. *Japan Times Weekly*, 9 June 1973. The report made certain assumptions which included lowering of the official discount rate from 5.5 percent to 5.0 percent by April 1974, that corporate taxes would be increased, that there would be no reduction in Government

expenditures in 1974, and that the *yen* would continue floating until the market revalues it by 25.7 percent against the Smithsonian rate of ¥308 = $1. Foreign currency reserves were predicted to decrease to about $11 billion in 1977.

17. John W. Hall, "Aspects of Japanese Economic Development," John W. Hall and Richard K. Beardsley, *Twelve Doors to Japan* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 577.

18. *Peking Review*, 5 December 1969, No. 49, pp. 14-16; reprint of *Renmin Ribao* editorial of 28 November 1969.

19. See Shinkichi Eto, "Japan and China," in *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1972, p. 1, for an analysis of the changes in Peking's public views on Japanese defense policies.

20. Albert Axelbank, *Black Star over Japan* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1972), pp. xii-xiii.

21. Saburo Okita, "Japan's Economy and Foreign Policy," *Survey*, Autumn 1972, pp. 133-134.

22. *Defense White Paper*, p. 3.

23. A recent public opinion poll reported that only 35 percent of Japanese surveyed would welcome U.S. intervention. Zygmunt Nagorski, "Asia in Transition," *Christian Science Monitor*, 4 June 1973.

24. *Defense White Paper*, pp. 39-40.

25. Masamichi Inoki, *Kuni wo Mamoru*, Jitsugyoo no Nihonsha, Tokyo, November 1972. Material in this portion is taken from the chapter titled "Nihon no Anzen Hoshoo no arubeki sugata," pp. 191-204.

26. Herman Kahn, *The Emerging Japanese Superstate* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 165.

27. Kei Wakaizumi, "Japan Beyond 1970," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1969, p. 517.

28. Thomas A. Marks, "The Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons by Japan," *Military Review*, March 1973, p. 48.

29. Statement of Foreign Minister Ohira, *Japan Times Weekly*, 3 February 1973.

30. *Japan Times Weekly*, 3 February 1973.

31. George H. Quester, "Japan and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," *Asian Survey*, September 1970, pp. 775-776.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 777.

33. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Fragile Blossom* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 101.

34. George W. Ball.

35. See the excellent article by Douglas H. Mendel, Jr., "Japanese Defense in the 1970s: the Public View," *Asian Survey*, December 1970, pp. 1046-1069.

36. Editorial, "Takyokka suru Sekai wo Ugokasu mono," *Asahi Shinbun*, 5 January 1973.

37. Wakaizumi, pp. 516-520.

38. Franz Michael and Gaston J. Sigur, *The Asian Alliance: Japan and United States Policy* (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1972), p. 80.

Ψ

Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the most ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates.

Alexander Hamilton: The Federalist, 1787